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1 Introduction
Search theoretic models are widely used with various levels of details as to the actual
search andmeeting process. In the simplest form agents meet each other with exogenously
given rates, while in more detailed models the agents may choose their search eﬀorts and
whether to search or wait. The very question of who wait and who search is addressed in
a search model of endogenous money by Burdett, Coles, Kiyotaki and Wright (1995). In
the model some agents are money holders, or buyers, and others are commodity holders,
or sellers. Searching involves an explicit cost which may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent kinds
of agents, while waiting involves no explicit costs. The authors determine the equilibria
of the model when the agents’ basic strategic choice is whether to search or wait. Not
too surprisingly there are many equilibria depending on the costs. But matters of co-
ordination also generate multiple equilibria. Roughly put, if all sellers wait, then all the
buyers must search, and vice versa. To gain some insight into the likelihood that it is
the buyers (or sellers) who search, the authors compare the sizes of the parameter space
supporting various equilibria. Their result is that the larger the number of diﬀerent
commodities, or the more diﬃcult the double coincidence problem of barter, the more
likely it is that the money holders, or buyers, search.
The link between the size of the parameter space supporting an equilibrium and the
likelihood of that equilibrium is tenuous at best. In this article we try to oﬀer a more
straightforward link between the likelihood of the search decision and the fundamentals
of the economy using a model where there are only two kinds of agents called buyers and
sellers. We do not introduce any costs of searching, but the search decision turns out to
depend on the trading mechanism and the ratio of buyers to sellers. We use auction and
bargaining as alternative trading rules. Herreiner (1999) studies also the question about
who searches, but she ignores price formation.
Given a trading mechanism we are interested in how the ratio of buyers to sellers
aﬀects the likelihood of searching for both types. We focus on symmetric (mixed strat-
egy) equilibria and ignore the two co-ordination game like equilibria where all buyers
search and all sellers wait or vice versa. The mixed strategy then has a straightforward
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interpretation as the likelihood that a particular type of agent searches rather than waits.
It turns out that mixed strategy equilibria do not exist when the numbers of buyers and
sellers diﬀer a lot. In this case we postulate that the reasonable equilibrium is the one
where the mixed strategy equilibrium converges to when the numbers of buyers and sell-
ers change appropriately. Kultti and Takalo (1999) also investigate this kind of model
but their focus is on the evolutionary stability of markets with diﬀerent trading rules and
search patterns.
The main result of the present article is that the members of the larger population
search and those of the smaller population wait. We check that this equilibrium is
immune against coalitional deviations. If the populations are equal enough, there are
two markets: buyers search in one market and sellers in the other. In this case we show
that auction is more eﬃcient trading rule than bargaining, because the agents are split
into the markets in more advantageous proportions. The rest of the article is organised
as follows: Section 2 presents a matching model with decision to search or wait, and
in Sections 3 and 4 we incorporate the trading rules into the model. In Section 5 we
derive the main result of the paper: who search and who wait. The relative eﬃciency
of auction and bargaining is studied in Section 6. In Section 7 we extend the model to
a one where agents do not decide whether to search or wait but they choose which of
the many marketplaces to go, and we compare the eﬃciency of that market structure to
that of the basic model. Section 8 concludes. The derivations of the results are in the
Appendix.
2 The Model
There are B buyers each with a unit demand and S sellers each with one indivisible
object for sale. The buyers get utility normalised to one from consuming the object, and
the sellers get utility normalised to zero from consuming it. The economy extends to
infinity, and time proceeds in discrete periods. The agents discount future with factor
δ ∈ (0, 1). When the agents trade they exit the economy and are replaced by identical
but unmatched agents. This means that the ratio of buyers to sellers remains the same
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in every period.
To model the meeting process we use an urn-ball model (see for example Lu and
McAfee, 1996). The agents who decide to wait are in fixed positions, one agent in each
location, and the agents who decide to search are randomly and independently allocated
on the waiting agents. This meeting technology is well defined and tractable. Further,
since multiple meetings are possible one can meaningfully study a variety of trading
mechanisms. If w agents wait and m agents move, the number of agents a waiting
agent meets is a binomial random variable with parameters m and 1/w. Tractability is
achieved by assuming that w and m are infinite, since in this case one can approximate
the binomial with a Poisson distribution with parameterm/w. Then the probability that
a waiting agent meets exactly k moving agents is e−m/w (m/w)k /k!.
We are going to investigate two diﬀerent trading mechanisms: auction and bargaining.
Auction is modelled as a second price sealed bid procedure in which everyone in a meeting
participates. For concreteness, consider a seller who waits and meets exactly one buyer.
Then the seller bids his reservation value, which is the same as ignoring the buyer and
waiting for new trading opportunities in the next period; and the buyer bids one minus
the seller’s reservation value. The buyer wins the object and pays the seller’s reservation
value. If the seller meets two or more buyers, both buyers bid the same and one of
them gets the object. It does not matter which buyer gets the object since the buyers
are indiﬀerent between getting the object and searching for new trading opportunities.
Another way to look at the auction is that in the first case the buyer makes a take-it-
or-leave-it oﬀer, and in the second case the buyers engage in a Bertrand-type bidding.
Bargaining is always pairwise, and if a seller meets several buyers he just picks one of
them at random for his trading partner. To make things simple we assume that the
buyer and seller just split the available surplus in half. One would probably also want to
consider the case of posted prices. Kultti (1999) shows that this is equivalent to auction.
Since both buyers and sellers can decide to wait or search, we consider two markets.
In one market proportion x of buyers search and proportion y of sellers wait. In the
other market proportion 1− x of buyers wait and proportion 1− y of sellers search. In
equilibrium the buyers have to do equally well regardless of whether they wait or search.
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The same must hold for the sellers. Of course, it is not necessarily the case that this
condition is consistent with there being two markets, and in these cases there will be
only one market in equilibrium.
Let us denote the ratio of total number of buyers to that of sellers by B/S = θ.
In the market where the sellers wait the ratio of searchers to waiters is xB/yS = xθ/y
≡ γ, and in the market where the buyers wait the relevant ratio is (1− y)S/(1− x)B =
(1− y) / (1− x) θ ≡ ϕ. In other words, the number of agents that arrive in a seller’s or
buyer’s location is governed by a Poisson process with parameter γ or ϕ , respectively.
Let us next determine the agents’ expected utilities in each market with the two trading
mechanisms.
3 Auction
Consider the market where sellers wait. Let us determine a seller’s expected life time
utility Vs and a buyer’s expected life time utility Vb, evaluated in the very end of a period,
as
Vs = δ
£
e−γVs + γe
−γVs +
¡
1− e−γ − γe−γ
¢
(1− Vb)
¤
, (1)
Vb = δ
£
e−γ (1− Vs) +
¡
1− e−γ
¢
Vb
¤
. (2)
In (1) the first term in the square brackets is the probability of the seller meeting
no-one in which case he gets his expected life time utility from waiting, Vs. The second
term is the probability of meeting exactly one buyer. In this case the seller also gets Vs
since the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the seller. The take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer
assumption gives the movers a positive probability to get the whole surplus of the trade
(like the stayers have, too), treating the stayers and movers as equally as possible. The
third term is the probability of meeting two or more buyers in which case the buyers get
their reservation utility and the seller gets the rest of the surplus, 1 − Vb. It should be
noted that a buyer always meets a seller. Thus, the probability that no other buyers meet
the same seller is e−γ, and in this case the buyer gets all the surplus from the meeting,
1− Vs. This is the first term in the square brackets in (2). If other buyers appear, each
of them gets his expected utility from searching, Vb.
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Solving (1) and (2) yields
Vs =
δ (1− e−γ − γe−γ)
1− δγe−γ , (3)
Vb =
δe−γ
1− δγe−γ . (4)
In an analogous fashion one can calculate the buyers’ and sellers’ expected life time
utilities in the market where the buyers wait. In this case, if only one seller arrives, he
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the buyer. The life-time values are
Ws =
δe−ϕ
1− δϕe−ϕ , (5)
Wb =
δ (1− e−ϕ − ϕe−ϕ)
1− δϕe−ϕ . (6)
4 Bargaining
There is basically only one point that may not be immediate in deriving the expected
utilities. When there are two or more buyers in a meeting with a seller, one of the buyers
is selected at random, and the probability that a buyer gets to trade with a seller is
e−γ
∞X
k=0
γk
k!
1
k + 1
=
1− e−γ
γ
. (7)
Consider first the market where sellers wait and use the same notation for the expected
utilities as in the auction setting. The life time utilities are determined by
Vs = δ
·
e−γVs +
¡
1− e−γ
¢µ
Vs +
1
2
(1− Vb − Vs)
¶¸
, (8)
Vb = δ
·
1− e−γ
γ
µ
Vb +
1
2
(1− Vb − Vs)
¶
+
γ − 1 + e−γ
γ
Vb
¸
, (9)
and solving these gives
Vs =
δγ (1− e−γ)
(2− δ − δe−γ)γ + δ(1− e−γ) , (10)
Vb =
δ (1− e−γ)
(2− δ − δe−γ)γ + δ(1− e−γ) . (11)
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The corresponding utilities in the market where sellers search are
Ws =
δ (1− e−ϕ)
(2− δ − δe−ϕ)ϕ+ δ(1− e−ϕ) , (12)
Wb =
δϕ (1− e−ϕ)
(2− δ − δe−ϕ)ϕ+ δ(1− e−ϕ) . (13)
5 The Equilibrium Market Structure
So far we have determined the expected utilities of the agents under auction and bargain-
ing, but we have not said anything about the equilibrium of the economy. Since there is
an infinite number of agents, Nash-equilibrium does not provide suﬃcient restrictions as
any deviating agent is of measure zero, and his behaviour does not aﬀect anything but
his own utility. We require that the equilibrium should be immune against a deviation
by a coalition of agents. In more detail, it should be impossible for a coalition of buyers
and sellers to put up another market where both of them do better than in equilibrium.
It is immediate that this is impossible if there are two markets in equilibrium. The crite-
rion, however, selects one of the two symmetric pure-strategy equilibria: under auction
it selects the very equilibrium to which the mixed strategy equilibrium converges when
the ratio of buyers to sellers increases or decreases without bound. Under bargaining the
criterion gives a sharp and not obvious result as almost surely there are no mixed-strategy
equilibria, and it selects from the two pure strategy equilibria.
As an example to motivate coalitional deviations, consider the following situation:
sellers advertise that they have an object for sale, buyers observe the advertisements and
choose which seller to contact. Then it should not be possible that someone, say, puts
up a magazine and manages to induce some buyers to put ads there and some sellers to
buy the magazine (and then contact the buyers).
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a pair (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2, where x is the proportion of buyers
who search and y is the proportion of sellers who wait, such that no coalition of buyers and
sellers can put up a new market such that all deviators fare better than in the equilibrium.
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To determine who search and who wait is quite straightforward even though the
detailed analysis involves a little computation in some cases. The aim is to determine
an equilibrium in which both markets are active, i.e. an equilibrium where some buyers
as well as sellers both wait and search. This means that waiting buyers have to be
equally well-oﬀ as searching buyers. The same condition must hold for sellers, too. This
requirement produces two conditions
Vs =Ws, (14)
Vb =Wb, (15)
for the two unknowns x and y. Of course, we have to solve these for both trading
mechanisms. It is not always the case that two markets exist simultaneously. Then there
are two equilibria: one in which all buyers search and all sellers wait, and another one
where all buyers wait and all sellers search. We return to this point later, and then we
evaluate which equilibrium is more likely. One should notice that these two equilibria
always exist but since they look like equilibria in a pure co-ordination game, we focus on
the other equilibria when they exist.
Lemma 1 Under auction two markets exist only if 1/θ3 < θ < θ3, where θ3 ≈1.146. In
equilibrium x = (θ3 (θθ3 − 1)) /
¡
θ
¡
θ23 − 1
¢¢
and y = (θθ3 − 1) /
¡
θ23 − 1
¢
.
Proof. In the Appendix.
This is already derived in Kultti and Takalo (1999), and it is noticeable that when
two markets exist, the ratio of searchers to waiters in both markets is constant, namely
θ3.
Lemma 2 Under bargaining two markets exist only if θ = 1. All configurations x = y
∈ (0, 1) are equilibria.
Proof. In the Appendix.
This is also derived in Kultti and Takalo (1999). Outside the above regions for θ,
only buyers or sellers search. Propositions 1 and 2 state the main result of this article:
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Proposition 1 If trades are consummated by auction, i) all the buyers search and all
the sellers wait if θ > θ3, ii) all the buyers wait and all the sellers search if θ < 1/θ3.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Proposition 2 When trades are consummated by bargaining, i) all the buyers search
and all the sellers wait if θ > 1, ii) all the buyers wait and all the sellers search if θ < 1.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The utilities from waiting and moving depend on the Poisson parameter that governs
the movers’ arrival to waiters’ locations. With both trading rules, if all buyers search
and all sellers wait, a profitable deviation by buyers requires that in the new market
the Poisson parameter is large enough, whereas a deviation by sellers requires that it
is small enough. These ranges for the value of the parameter do not overlap if θ is
large enough. On the other hand, if all buyers wait and all sellers search and θ is small
enough, we cannot find a value for the parameter that induces both types of agents to
deviate. There are, however, values of θ that enable profitable deviation, indicating that
the original market market structure is not an equilibrium.
6 The Relative Eﬃciency of Trading Rules
Here we conduct a rather straightforward comparison of eﬃciency under bargaining and
auction. The eﬃciency measure is the number of trades per period (which in steady state
is the same each period). This is interesting only when two markets exist since if there is
only one market under either trading rule, the same type of agents wait, and the number
of trades is the same. Let us denote the number of trades per period under auction or
bargaining by Mau and Mba, and let E =Mau/Mba.
There are several cases to be studied, and we list them below. Note that under
bargaining the only case when there are two markets in equilibrium is when the number
of buyers equals the number of sellers, i.e. θ = 1. But then any configuration x = y
∈ [0, 1] is an equilibrium, and in all such equilibria the utility of a given type of agent
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is the same. the agents’ utilities are the same. Thus, the cases are distinguished by the
parameter intervals relevant in auction.
Case a) θ < 1/θ3. All the buyers wait (whether auction or bargaining is used), and
the number of matches is Mau =Mba =
¡
1− e−1/θ
¢
B.
Case b) θ > θ3. All the sellers wait (whether auction or bargaining is used), and the
number of matches mirrors that of case a: Mau =Mba =
¡
1− e−θ
¢
S.
Case c) 1/θ3 < θ < 1. There are two markets if auction is used. In one market
there are yS sellers who wait and xB buyers who move, in the other market (1− x)B
buyers wait for the (1− y)S sellers to visit. The Poisson parameter in both markets
is equal to θ3. The number of matches is the sum of the matches in two markets:
Mau = yS
¡
1− e−θ3
¢
+ (1− x)B
¡
1− e−θ3
¢
, and using Lemma 1 we have
Mau =
1− e−θ3
θ23 − 1
·
(θθ3 − 1)S +
θ3 − θ
θ
B
¸
. (16)
If bargaining is used, all buyers wait and all sellers search, thus Mba =
¡
1− e−1/θ
¢
B.
The relative eﬃciency of auction to bargaining is then
E =
¡
1− e−θ3
¢
(1 + θ)
(1 + θ3) (1− e−1/θ) θ
> 1, (17)
and it can be shown that ∂E/∂θ > 0: The eﬃciency of auction relative to bargaining
increases as the ratio B/S increases.
Case d) 1 < θ < θ3. In auction, two markets exist, and the sum of matches is
yS
¡
1− e−θ3
¢
+ (1− x)B
¡
1− e−θ3
¢
, the same as in case c. In case of bargaining, all
sellers wait, and Mba =
¡
1− e−θ
¢
S, and we have
E =
¡
1− e−θ3
¢
(1 + θ)
(1 + θ3) (1− e−θ)
> 1, (18)
and ∂E/∂θ > 0. The smaller the value of θ, the more eﬃcient auction is relative to
bargaining.
We can summarise the results in
Proposition 3 Auction is more eﬃcient than bargaining if 1/θ3 < θ < θ3. Outside this
region, auction and bargaining are equally eﬃcient.
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This result is based on the comparison of equilibria that satisfy Definition 1. The
matching functions above have constant returns to scale, yet two ‘small’ markets can
perform better than one large market. The explanation for this is that in one small
market buyers search and in the other they wait, and the ratio of movers to stayers in
both markets is more advantageous than in the one large market.
7 Extension: Common Locations
In the model presented above, either the buyers go to the sellers’ locations or the sellers
visit the buyers. This is, however, only one of many conceivable meeting technologies.
For example, one could think that in the beginning of each period, each buyer is in his
location and each seller is in his location. Then some buyers leave their locations and
go to sellers’ locations to visit them. The rest of the buyers stay put in their locations
and wait for visiting sellers. Sellers, too, have a choice to stay or to go and visit the
buyers. This model is analysed in Kultti, Miettunen and Virrankoski (2003), where the
equilibrium choices of staying and visiting are derived. In the sequel we consider an
environment where neither buyers nor sellers have their own locations. Instead, there are
several marketplaces, or common locations. Each agent goes randomly to one location
in every period until she trades and leaves the economy. Trading within a location is
frictionless: the number of matches in location i is equal to min {Bi, Si} where Bi and
Si are the numbers of buyers and sellers who happen to choose location i. Frictions arise
because the agents are randomly distributed on the locations. We compare the number
of matches and agents’ life-time values in this model to those in the basic model analysed
above.
The tradable object is indivisible, and there are B buyers and S sellers with the same
preferences as in the basic model. In order to trade, they have to go to marketplaces.
The number of such locations is L, and we assume that L = B + S. In the beginning of
each period, each buyer and seller chooses randomly which location to go. Every location
then has more buyers than sellers, or more sellers than buyers, or equally many of them.
Some locations may remain empty. The trading mechanism is a mixture of auction and
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bargaining in the following way: If the number of buyers and sellers in a location is
unequal, there is an auction. The more numerous type gets his reservation value, and
the less numerous type gets one minus the other’s reservation value. If there is an equal
number of buyers and sellers, they bargain such that everyone gets his reservation value
plus one half of the surplus. In the equal-numbered case we assume bargaining because we
want to treat buyers and sellers symmetrically. Agents who have traded exit the market,
and they are replaced by identical but unmatched agents. Let a (b) be the probability
that there are more (less) buyers than sellers, respectively, in a location chosen by a buyer.
Let c (d) be the probability that there are more (less) sellers than buyers, respectively,
in a location chosen by a seller. The value functions are, for a buyer and for a seller,
V cob = δ
·
aVb + b (1− Vs) + (1− a− b)
µ
Vb +
1
2
(1− Vb − Vs)
¶¸
, (19)
V cos = δ
·
cVs + d (1− Vb) + (1− c− d)
µ
Vs +
1
2
(1− Vb − Vs)
¶¸
. (20)
Solving for Vb and Vs gives
V cob =
δ (1− a+ b)
2− δ (a− b+ c− d) , (21)
V cos =
δ (1− c+ d)
2− δ (a− b+ c− d) . (22)
The probabilities a, b, c and d cannot be solved analytically. Instead, they are solved
numerically by calculating the cumulative Poisson distribution functions for the number
of buyers and sellers in a location. We have
i) a = G0F0 + (G1 −G0)F1 + (G2 −G1)F2 + ...,
ii) b = G0 (1− F1) + (G1 −G0) (1− F2) + (G2 −G1) (1− F3) + ...,
iii) c = F0G0 + (F1 − F0)G1 + (F2 − F1)G2 + ..., and
iv) d = F0 (1−G1) + (F1 − F0) (1−G2) + (F2 − F1) (1−G3) + ...,
where Fn is the probability that at most n other sellers have come to the location,
and Gn is the probability that at most n buyers have arrived. The probabilities a, b, c
and d are solved for cases θ = 1/3, 1/2, 1, 2, and 3. Note that the absolute values of B
and S do not matter, but θ (= B/S) does. We let δ = 0.9.
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We first compare the eﬃciency of the common-locations model to that of the basic
model (with auction and bargaining). In the common-locations model, the number of
matches is
Mco = bB + dS + (1− a− b)B, (23)
where bB is the number of matches that form in locations where there are less buyers
than sellers, dS is the number of matches in locations where there are less sellers than
buyers, and (1− a− b)B matches form in locations where there are equally many buyers
and sellers. We can writeMco = dS+(1−a)B, and as a measure of eﬃciency we use the
number of matches per seller, Mco/S = d+(1−a)θ. The eﬃciency measures in the basic
model areMau/S andMba/S, where we take into account that there are two markets for
certain values of θ. Table 1 summarises the eﬃciency in each model:
Table 1: Eﬃciency in the common-locations model and in the basic model
Mco/S Mau/S Mba/S
θ = 1/3 0.162 0.317 0.317
θ = 1/2 0.217 0.432 0.432
θ = 1 0.326 0.636 0.632
θ = 2 0.435 0.865 0.865
θ = 3 0.485 0.950 0.950
The meeting technology of the basic model is roughly two times as eﬃcient as that
of the common locations model.
Next we compare the life-time utilities of buyers and sellers in the common-locations
model to those in the basic model. In the basic model we consider both auction and
bargaining. The identity of movers and stayers is determined as stated in propositions
1 and 2. For example, if trades are consummated by bargaining, all the buyers search
and all the sellers wait if θ = 2 or if θ = 3, and so on. Let us use the following notation:
V aub and V
au
s are the life-time utilities for buyers and sellers in the basic model when the
trading mechanism is auction; V bab and V
ba
s are the respective values when bargaining is
used, and V cob and V
co
s are the utilities in the common-locations model. Table 2 presents
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the utilities:
Table 2: Welfare of buyers and sellers in the
common-locations model and in the basic model
V cob V
au
b V
ba
b V
co
s V
au
s V
ba
s
θ = 1/3 0.628 0.833 0.639 0.135 0.052 0.213
θ = 1/2 0.548 0.708 0.570 0.206 0.161 0.285
θ = 1 0.372 0.426 0.425 0.372 0.426 0.425
θ = 2 0.206 0.161 0.285 0.548 0.708 0.570
θ = 3 0.135 0.052 0.213 0.628 0.833 0.639
Table 3 shows the ordering of utilities:
Table 3: Ordering of utilities
Buyers Sellers
θ = 1/3 and θ = 1/2 V aub > V
ba
b > V
co
b V
ba
s > V
co
s > V
au
s
θ = 1 V aub > V
ba
b > V
co
b V
au
s > V
ba
s > V
co
s
θ = 2 and θ = 3 V bab > V
co
b > V
au
b V
au
s > V
ba
s > V
co
s
We see that the configuration with common locations is dominated by the basic config-
uration with either auction or bargaining. This is due to large number of locations, as
it is clear that letting the number of locations go to one yields the maximum number
of meetings. We also see that when the number of buyers and sellers in the economy is
equal, the buyers and sellers in the basic configuration prefer auction to bargaining. This
result holds with all δ ≤ 1.
8 Conclusion
We take a standard urn-ball model with buyers and sellers and study a symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium when the agents’ choice set consist of the decision to wait
or search. Focusing on mixed symmetric strategies looks reasonable as in large markets
pure-strategy equilibria seem to require plenty of co-ordination. On top of that, sym-
metric strategies indicate how likely it is for a certain type of agent to search. This way
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we get a quite clear-cut picture of the search and wait decisions. The main conlcusion is
that the more numerous party is more likely to search, regardless of how terms of trade
are determined. If the diﬀerence between the number of buyers and sellers is large, there
exists only a pure-strategy equilibrium where the more numerous agents search and the
less numerous agents wait.
Our results should be of interest for modelling purposes as it is customary to assume
that one type, eg. employers in labour market, or sellers in decentralised goods market,
or women in marriage market, wait and the other type searches. These assumptions
seem well motivated if the waiting type is not significantly more numerous, but in the
opposite case the practice is in doubt. The model also has an obvious empirically testable
implication. The results are very clear due to the small number of equilibria, as we do
not assume that there are any costs of searching or waiting, or any kind of heterogeneity.
One may want to relax these assumptions, but it is likely to lead to a huge number of
equilibria while in our simple setting there are practically at most three configurations
that may be regarded as equilibria under any reasonable criterion.
9 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Equilibrium conditions Wb = Vb and Ws = Vs yield by (3)-(6) that
eγ − 1− γ = 1
eϕ − 1− ϕ (A1)
which is equivalent to
eγ =
eϕ − ϕ
eϕ − 1− ϕ + γ. (A2)
The buyers’ equilibrium condition Wb = Vb yields
eγ − 1− γ
eγ − δγ =
1
eϕ − δϕ (A3)
which is equivalent to
eγ =
eϕ − δϕ
eϕ − 1− ϕ + δγ. (A4)
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Next we show that there is a unique solution ϕ = γ = θ3 for (A1) and (A3) to hold
where eθ3 − 2− θ3 = 0. Equations (A2) and (A4) yield
γ =
ϕ
eϕ − 1− ϕ. (A5)
Equations (A2) and (A5) yield eγ/γ = eϕ/ϕ which is equivalent to ef(ϕ)/f (ϕ) = eϕ/ϕ
where f (ϕ) = ϕ/ (eϕ − 1− ϕ). Still, a more convenient form is
f (ϕ)− ϕ = ln f (ϕ)
ϕ
. (A6)
The left-hand side and the right-hand side of (A6) are plus infinity at ϕ = 0. The
derivative of the left-hand side is
f 0 (ϕ)− 1 = e
ϕ − 1− ϕeϕ
(eϕ − 1− ϕ)2
− 1 (A7)
which is negative for ϕ > 0. The derivative of the right-hand side is (1− eϕ) / (eϕ − 1− ϕ)
which is also negative for ϕ > 0.
Let us compare the derivatives; we show that the derivative of the left-hand side is
smaller than that of the right-hand side for small values of the argument. Formally,
eϕ − 1− ϕeϕ
(eϕ − 1− ϕ)2
− 1 < 1− e
ϕ
eϕ − 1− ϕ (A8)
which is equivalent to eϕ − 1 − ϕ − ϕ2 < 0 , which holds as long as ϕ is less than 1.8
(approximately). Thus, there is at most one zero. One immediately sees that θ3 > 1 is
a root of equation (A6) where θ3 satisfies 2 + θ3 − eθ3 = 0, yielding θ3 = ϕ = γ ≈ 1.146.
Two auction markets exist only if
γ =
xθ
y
= ϕ =
1− y
(1− x) θ = θ3. (A9)
Solving this yields y = (x/θ3) θ, which inserted into the latter equation gives
x =
θ3 (θθ3 − 1)
θ
¡
θ23 − 1
¢ , (A10)
from which we see that equilibrium with two auction markets exists if and only if θ3 >
θ > 1/θ3. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2
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The equilibrium conditions Wb = Vb and Ws = Vs yield by (10)-(13) that γ = 1/ϕ.
Inserting this back to one of the equilibrium conditions gives
1− e−γ − γ
¡
1− e−1/γ
¢
= 0. (A11)
Next we show that (A11) has exactly one positive solution, γ = 1. Let us study function
g(h) = eh − 1 − heh + heh−1/h that has the same zeroes as the left-hand side in (A11).
We immediately see that g(0) = 0. The derivative of g is
g0(h) = −heh + eh−1/h
µ
h+ 1 +
1
h
¶
, (A12)
and since
¡
e−1/h/h
¢
= 0 at h = 0 we see that g0(0) = 0. The second derivative of g is
g00(h) = −eh − heh + heh−1/h
µ
2 + h+
2
h
+
1
h3
¶
, (A13)
and g00(0) = −1. Thus, at first g is decreasing. It is also immediate that g(1) = 0 and
g0(1) > 0. Next we show that g is not zero between h = 0 and h = 1. If there were zeroes
between h = 0 and h = 1 and if g attained strictly positive values, there should be at
least two zeroes. Before the last zero g would reach a maximum and its derivative would
be zero. Let us denote the last maximum of g (where it is positive) by k.Thus we know
that
g0(k) = −kek + ek−1/k
µ
k + 1 +
1
k
¶
= 0, (A14)
and g(k) = ek − 1− kek + kek−1/k > 0. From these conditions we get
g(k) = ek − 1− kek + k
3ek
1 + k + k2
> 0 (A15)
which holds if and only if ek − 1 − k − k2 > 0. We have eh − 1 − h − h2 = 0 at h = 0
and eh − 1− h− h2 < 0 at h = 1. It is easy to see that eh − 1− h− h2 < 0 in interval
h ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, the assumption that g (h) > 0 at h ∈ (0, 1] leads to a contradiction,
thus g (h) < 0 at h ∈ (0, 1], and (A11) has no solution at γ ∈ (0, 1).
To show that equation 1 − e−γ − γ + γe−1/γ = 0 has no solution at γ > 1 it is
enough to show that g0(h) = −heh + eh−1/h (h+ 1 + 1/h) > 0 when h > 1, because
g(1) = 0 and g0(h) > 0 at h = 1. The sign of g0(h) is positive if and only if v(h) ≡
1 − e−1/h − e−1/h/h − e−1/h/h2 < 0. We see that v(1) < 0 and lim
h→∞
v(h) = 0. Further,
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v0(h) = e−1/h (1/h3) (1− 1/h) which is positive if h > 1. That is, v(h) < 0 if h > 1, thus
g0(h) = −heh+eh−1/h (h+ 1 + 1/h) > 0 when h > 1, consequently (A11) has no solution
at γ > 1.
We have shown that equation 1 − e−γ − γ + γe−1/γ = 0 has exactly one strictly
positive solution, γ = 1. If γ ∈ (0, 1), then 1− e−γ − γ + γe−1/γ < 0, and if γ > 1, then
1 − e−γ − γ + γe−1/γ > 0. Analogously, it is easy to see that there does exist a zero z
such that g(z) = 0 is a local maximum. In equilibrium γ = 1/ϕ which holds if and only
if x = y. Combined with γ = 1, we conclude that two bargaining markets exist if and
only if θ = 1, for any x and y such that x = y. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of part (i) of the proposition is shown here. The proof of part (ii) is
analogous and is left to the reader.
(i) In case θ > θ3 we show that if all the buyers wait and all the sellers search, there is
a coalition of buyers and sellers who are better oﬀ in a market where buyers search and
sellers wait, implying that the former market is not an equilibrium. On the other hand,
if all the buyers search and all the sellers wait, a profitable deviating coalition cannot
exist.
All buyers wait and all sellers search
Let ψ = 1/θ be the parameter of the Poisson process in the original market where
buyers wait and sellers search, and let α = ηB/µS be the respective parameter in the
new market where sellers wait and buyers search. Because θ > θ3, then ψ < 1/θ3. A
seller’s utility in the original market is V os , and his utility in the new, deviating market
is V ns . The corresponding utilities for a buyer are V
o
b and V
n
b . A profitable deviation for
a seller requires V ns > V
o
s :
1− e−α − αe−α
1− δαe−α >
e−ψ
1− δψe−ψ , (A16)
and condition V nb > V
o
b for deviating buyers is
e−α
1− δαe−α >
1− e−ψ − ψe−ψ
1− δψe−ψ . (A17)
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Let α1 satisfy V ns = V
o
s :
1− e−α1 − α1e−α1
1− δα1e−α1
=
e−ψ
1− δψe−ψ , (A18)
and let α2 satisfy V nb = V
o
b :
e−α2
1− δα2e−α2
=
1− e−ψ − ψe−ψ
1− δψe−ψ . (A19)
Next we show that a deviating coalition exists if α1 < α2, in case we can choose
α ∈ (α1, α2) that satisfies (A16) and (A17). After that we show that α1 < α2 for all
ψ ∈ (0, 1/θ3]. Expression
¡
1− e−h − he−h
¢
/
¡
1− δhe−h
¢
is increasing in h:
∂
µ
1− e−h − he−h
1− δhe−h
¶
∂h
=
e−h
£
(1− δ)h+ δ
¡
1− e−h
¢¤
(1− δhe−h)2
, (A20)
and e−h/
¡
1− δhe−h
¢
is decreasing in h:
∂
µ
e−h
1− δhe−h
¶
∂h
=
−e−h
¡
1− δe−h
¢
(1− δhe−h)2
. (A21)
In Figure 1, h is on the horizontal axis, and ψ, θ3, α1 and α2 are the values of our
interest. We see that if curve
¡
1− e−h − he−h
¢
/
¡
1− δhe−h
¢
is steeper than curve
e−h/
¡
1− δhe−h
¢
, then α1 < α2, and we can choose α ∈ (α1, α2) that satisfies (A16)
and (A17). If α1 > α2, a deviating coalition does not exist.
The sum of the right-hand sides of (A20) and (A21) is equal to
e−h (1− δ) (h− 1)
(1− δhe−h)2
, (A22)
and we note that curve
¡
1− e−h − he−h
¢
/
¡
1− δhe−h
¢
is steeper than curve
e−h/
¡
1− δhe−h
¢
if h > 1. That is, if ψ is larger than one, then α1 < α2. However,
the value of ψ is assumed to be less than 1/θ3 which is smaller than one. Do we have
α1 < α2 for all ψ < 1? In order to have α1 > α2, we should have α1 = α2 for some value
of ψ. Next we show that this is not possible.
Let α satisfy
1− e−α − αe−α
1− δαe−α =
e−ψ
1− δψe−ψ (A23)
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Figure 1: A deviating coalition exists.
and
e−α
1− δαe−α =
1− e−ψ − ψe−ψ
1− δψe−ψ . (A24)
By summing (A23) and (A24) we get
1− αe−α
1− ψe−ψ =
1− δαe−α
1− δψe−ψ (A25)
which holds for an arbitrary value of δ only if αe−α = ψe−ψ. Equations (A23) and (A24)
then yield
e−α = 1− e−ψ − ψe−ψ, (A26)
e−ψ = 1− e−α − αe−α. (A27)
Obviously, α = ψ = θ3 solves (A26) and (A27). Are there other solutions? Solving α
from (A26) yields α = − ln
¡
1− e−ψ − ψe−ψ
¢
, and using this in (A27) we get
−ψe−ψ
1− e−ψ − ψe−ψ = ln
¡
1− e−ψ − ψe−ψ
¢
. (A28)
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Subtracting the derivative of the left-hand side from the derivative of the right-hand side
equals
ψe−ψ
1− e−ψ − ψe−ψ −
e−ψ
¡
e−ψ + ψ − 1
¢
(1− e−ψ − ψe−ψ)2
(A29)
which has the same sign as 1− e−ψ − ψe−ψ − ψ2e−ψ. This equals zero at ψ = 0, and
∂
¡
1− e−ψ − ψe−ψ − ψ2e−ψ
¢
∂ψ
= ψe−ψ (ψ − 1) (A30)
which is negative if ψ < 1. At ψ = 1.2 (> θ3) we have 1−e−ψ−ψe−ψ−ψ2e−ψ ≈ −0.0096,
and we conclude that 1 − e−ψ − ψe−ψ − ψ2e−ψ < 0 for ψ ∈ (0, θ3]. Thus the left-hand
side of (A28) can cut the right-hand side of (A28) only from below in interval ψ ∈ (0, θ3],
therefore (A28) has a unique solution in that interval. We conclude that (A26) and (A27)
have a unique solution, namely α = ψ = θ3. That is, there does not exist ψsmaller than
θ3 and a corresponding α larger than θ3 that satisfy (A23) and (A24). Because of that
and because α1 < α2 for ψ larger than one, we conclude that α1 < α2 for all ψ ∈ (0, 1/θ3],
and therefore a deviating coalition exists for all ψ ∈ (0, 1/θ3]. ¤
All buyers search and all sellers wait
This is a reverse case to the above. The Poisson parameter in the original market is
θ which is larger than θ3, and the Poisson parameter in the new market is ω which is
smaller than θ3. A profitable deviation requires that ω is smaller than ω1 which satisfies
V ns = V
o
s , given by
e−ω1
1− δω1e−ω1
=
1− e−θ − θe−θ
1− δθe−θ , (A31)
and larger than ω2 which satisfies V nb = V
o
b , given by
1− e−ω2 − ω2e−ω2
1− δω2e−ω2
=
e−θ
1− δθe−θ (A32)
Proceeding like in the above, it can be shown that ω1 < ω2 for all θ larger than θ3, and
a deviating coalition does not exist. ¤
ii) In case θ < 1/θ3 the proof goes similarly as in case θ > θ3, one just has to replace
buyers for sellers and sellers for buyers. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2
The logic of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. The proof is shown only for
part (i).
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(i) In case θ > 1 we show that if all the buyers wait and all the sellers search, there is
a coalition of buyers and sellers who are better oﬀ in a market where buyers search and
sellers wait, implying that the former market is not an equilibrium. On the other hand,
if all the buyers search and all the sellers wait, a profitable deviating coalition cannot
exist.
All buyers wait and all sellers search
The Poisson parameter in the original market is ψ = 1/θ, and the utilities are V ob for
a buyer and V os for a seller. The corresponding parameter in the deviating market where
buyers search and sellers wait is α = ηB/µS, and the utilities are V nb and V
n
s . Consider
a deviating coalition where sellers wait, buyers search, and the ratio of buyers to sellers
is α. Profitable deviation requires that V ns > V
o
s , and V
n
b > V
o
b , that is,
α (1− e−α)
(2− δ − δe−α)α+ δ(1− e−α) >
1− e−ψ
(2− δ − δe−ψ)ψ + δ(1− e−ψ) , (A33)
1− e−α
(2− δ − δe−α)α+ δ(1− e−α) >
ψ
¡
1− e−ψ
¢
(2− δ − δe−ψ)ψ + δ(1− e−ψ) . (A34)
Let α1 satisfy V ns = V
o
s , and let α2 satisfy V
n
b = V
o
b . Expression
1− e−h
(2− δ − δe−h)h+ δ(1− e−h) (A35)
is decreasing in h, and expression
h
¡
1− e−h
¢
(2− δ − δe−h)h+ δ(1− e−h) (A36)
is increasing in h. As in the proof of part (i) of Proposition 1, a deviating coalition
exists if α1 < α2. The curve given by (A36) is steeper than the curve given by (A35)
if 2 (1− δ)
¡
1− e−h − he−h − h2e−h
¢
< 0, which holds if h is suﬃciently small. Thus
α1 < α2 if ψ is suﬃciently close to one. As in the proof above, α1 > α2 requires that
α1 = α2 for some value of ψ. We show that the latter cannot happen. Let α satisfy
α (1− e−α)
(2− δ − δe−α)α+ δ(1− e−α) =
1− e−ψ
(2− δ − δe−ψ)ψ + δ(1− e−ψ) , (A37)
1− e−α
(2− δ − δe−α)α+ δ(1− e−α) =
ψ
¡
1− e−ψ
¢
(2− δ − δe−ψ)ψ + δ(1− e−ψ) . (A38)
Dividing the left-hand side of (A37) by the left-hand side of (A38), and doing the same
to right-hand sides gives
α = 1/ψ. (A39)
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Adding the left-hand side of (A37) to that of (A38), and doing the same to the right-hand
sides leads to
ψ
¡
1− e−α − αe−α
¢
= α
¡
1− e−ψ − ψe−ψ
¢
. (A40)
Obviously, α = ψ = 1 solves (A40). If this is the only solution, then α1 < α2 for all ψ
smaller than one. Because α = 1/ψ, we look for solutions to equation of form
h
¡
1− e−1/h − (1/h)e−1/h
¢
= (1/h)
¡
1− e−h − he−h
¢
. (A41)
At h = 1 the left-hand side is decreasing and the right-hand side is increasing. If another
strictly positive solution exists, the derivative of the right-hand side must be smaller than
the derivative of the left-hand side. It is however easy to show that in any strictly positive
solution to (A41), the derivative of the right-hand side is larger than the derivative of
the left-hand side, thus h = 1 is the only solution. Then α1 < α2 for all ψ smaller than
one, and we can choose α ∈ (α1, α2) such that V ns > V os and V nb > V ob .
If all sellers wait and all buyers search in the original market, the same logic is applied
to demonstrate that a deviating coalition does not exist. ¤
(ii) For θ < 1, the proof is analogous to case θ > 1 and is left to the reader. ¤
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